Sharing data within Grid environments can potentially result in losing control over data usage. If the shared information is medical data laws must be followed, enabling tightly controlled, reconstructible access. To comply with these regulations it must be guaranteed, that each data access and modification is recorded to enable audit trails. The provided solution introduces a new concept for virtualized Data Grid environments which consist of a secure virtual machines, harnessing secure data hosting and indemnifying thorough audit trails by logging each data interaction. This solves the problem of traceability and side-access.
I. INTRODUCTION
Grid Computing enables locally distributed users from different security domains controlled access to resources, fostering easy and fast collaboration. In Data Grids information accumulated in databases is shared within a Virtual Organization (VO), that consists of researchers with different affiliations and their resources. Authentication and authorization mechanisms are utilized to ensure data can only be accessed by legitimate persons. In case of highly sensitive data, such as health information, existing solutions do not provide adequate protection [1] . In that case regulations and laws often have to be complied with, stipulating a minimum level of security to assure confidentiality and privacy of the data. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Towards a Model for Side Access Free Grid Resources by Means of Virtualized Data Grids (HIPAA) [2] is an example of such a requirement. It has been enacted by U.S. Congress in 1996 and describes safeguards to be implemented to protect health data stored electronically. Some relevant directives listed in HIPAA for deployment of data within Grid environments are
• Identification of employees with access to electronically protected health information (EPHI) should be conducted. Access to EPHI must only be granted to those employees having a need for it to complete their job function. • Access authorization, establishment, modification, and termination must be audited. • Unauthorized changes of data (i.e. modification, deletion) must be prevented by each participating entity. • Mutual authentication of communicating parties is mandatory. Password systems, telephone callback, token systems, or certificates may be used as means of authentication. • Internal audits of computer systems must be conducted regularly. Evaluation of LOG files is part of those audits, ensuring detection of unintended usage of EPHI data.
As Grid Computing is often utilized to conduct clinical studies to share medical data amongst participating parties of a VO (examples are [3] , [4] , [5] and [6] ), compliance with HIPAA or other regulative standards is necessary. As can be deduced from requirements above the fulfilment of those standards is extremely challenging and thus poses challenges for umpteen researchers. Some of those demands, however, can only be met by implementing side-access-free audit trails during the whole data lifecyle, ranging from creation to storage and sharing of data. Hence, all data access (attempts) and modifications must be recorded and additionally confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation need to be warranted, which is not trivial to solve. Although solutions for confidentiality, integrity and authentication/ authorization are available [7] [8] [9] [10] , no full-fledged concept subsists, which combines those services and other security solutions to guarantee nonrepudiation or traceability of data usage. Special safeguards are required to truly meet challenges such as the following:
• Illegal data access: Administrators may illegally access records without being noticed. • Access Records: It is not possible or extremely difficult to determine who accessed which data (required by HIPAA), because of a lack of information.
• Integrity: It can hardly be proven, that data has not been modified/tampered with (unauthorized). • No real non-repudiation: Complete audit trails are needed for non-repudiation, not only authentication/authorization. • Least privilege: Who is able to access data X at a specific point in time t.
This may change and is hard to find out.
Although focus for compliance is limited to HIPAA in this paper, introduced solution is all-embracing and suits all domains anxious to protect sensitive data. The example of protecting health data was chosen, because underlying concept was developed to be applied within the GS-BAMOD [4] project, where detection of lung and oesophageal cancer based on exhaled breath is researched.
To meet requirements of this domain a new concept for a secure grid architecture was developed, ensuring traceability of all data access and modifications. Therefore, side-access-free Single Point of Access (SPOA) resources are assigned to virtual machines. These machines provide the SPOA via an OGSA-DAI [11] container, are protected by Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [12] and administrative access is enabled through a Grid portal. The main contribution of this solution is that access to the server, hosting sensitive data, is only available through one port/interface (SPOA), at which excessive logging can be enforced.
Additionally administrative tasks can be executed through this SPOA, tackling the often ignored problem of arbitrary, unrecognised and unaudited data access by administrators. This results in a side-access-free complete audit trail, satisfying even strict regulations, such as HIPAA, and retains full control over data access. By evaluating the resulting audit trails, every data interaction is reconstructible and non-repudiation requirements are met.
This solution neither can prevent unauthorized data modification nor can control what data usage after it has been requested by legitimate VO participants but is capable of detecting unauthorized modifications and can point to malicious activities. It also supports to revealing of non-adequate usage of data by non-repudiation and data access records.
Description of this solution is structured as follows: Sect. II describes related work, important for secure deployment of virtual machines and introduces terms and definitions. Section III provides details of the single point of access (SPOA) concept, along with the idea of a secure interactive fallback shell. The following section depicts technical details of all components introduced, followed by the setup of a SPOA environment and future work. The paper concludes by a summarizing the whole concept and outlining its benefits.
II. RELATED WORK
Before discussing the solutions in detail, we want to specify some terms and definitions. Since provided Grid security architecture incorporates thorough logging, the terms and their interrelationships need to be specified first (ref Fig. 1 ). As the Common Event Expression (CEE) project [13] has already published some definitions, we will reuse them and only summarize the meaning shortly or complement accordingly, if necessary:
• Event: An observable situation which gets noticed and recorded, i.e. written, into a file. • LOG Entry: A Single record written to a file describing the actions being conducted (e.g. PID: 21716 -Notice: 5: Authenticated globus user: /C=AT/ 0=AustrianGrid/OU=TUW/OU=IFS/CN=David Huemer). • LOG (File): A file containing several LOG entries, most often produced by a certain application (e.g. globus-gatekeeper.log for a system running Globus Toolkit [14] ).
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Towards a Model for Side Access Free Grid Resources by Means of Virtualized Data Grids Figure 1 . An Event is recorded as LOG Entry which is described by a LOG Taxonomy whereas it uses a predefined LOG Format. An Audit Trail consists of a LOG Entry whereas Aggregation, Correlation and Evaluation are conducted.
• LOG Format: Layout used for the LOG messages in the form of fields, separators, delimiters, tags, etc. to distinguish the distinct parts of one LOG entry (e.g.. first field;second field;...). • LOG Taxonomy: A taxonomy of LOG messages that categorizes LOG messages and codifies their meaning (e.g.. first field holds date, second field holds source IP address, ...). • Aggregation: Combination of several facts into one fact. For example if an event occurred several times and only the number of occurrences is important, a counter variable indicating the amount of the occurrence of this event can be recorded. Hence the summation is an aggregation, (e.g. Failed login of user "dhuemer" three times). • Correlation: Association of two or more LOG entries of unique events (recorded in different LOG files). • Audit trail: Collection of several LOG files to thoroughly reconstruct events being conducted on a system.
Following these definitions, we briefly introduce previous work, leading to the current solution. In [15] we present the concept of a secure data grid infrastructure. That is, side-access-free single point of access (SPOA) resources are allocated to a respective Regional Head Service (RHS), which has ultimate control over stored data, cf. Fig. 2 . The work introduced in this paper describes how the RHS and the SPOA parts of this solution are implemented and realized, especially how logging is enforced. The RHS part is implemented by a Gridsphere [16] portal, which offers different portlets that cover, amongst others, the following functionality: Deployment, management and monitoring of the side-access-free SPOA resources; Semantic Logging of interactions with the SPOA. The sideaccess-free SPOA resources are deployed by the RHS to Nimbus [17] resources. Details about the deployment are provided in the technical section of this paper, as well as in [18] , where we present a method to deploy an encrypted virtual machine whereas the ultimate data control and the integrity measurement of the resource remains on the user's, respectively deployer's behalf. This virtual machine is denoted secure virtual machine (SVM). We apply SVMs to generate a distributed trusted computing base, which lays the cornerstone for providing reliable SPOA resources. This solution further elaborates on [18] , as it defines how the secure virtual machines are built and how logging is enforced, to obtain reliable and complete audit trails.
To fully understand the impact of our solution, we first need to clarify the denotation side-access-free. We deduce the term from the semantics of notations like side-effect free 1 and side-channel attack [19] , which both refer to an unintended usage path of a given item, possibly resulting in an exploit.
We apply the denotation side-access-freemss to the SVMs deployed to the available virtual machine resources. They are protected against access to the system not originating from the dedicated SPOA web service (which will be explained in the following section). A possible access subverting the SPOA could be the connection of a pseudo terminal to the virtual machine through the Xen hypervisor commandline, or the direct snooping of memory.
162
Towards a Model for Side Access Free Grid Resources by Means of Virtualized Data Grids Figure 2 . Exemplary distributed secure data grid infrastructure.
III. SECURE GRID ARCHITECTURE CONCEPT
As described above, sharing sensitive data requires to assure that every interaction with the database (hosted within the SVM which hosts the sensitive data) is recorded and traceable. We accomplish this by applying the SPOA concept to a database realized by OGSA-DAI and operated within a Globus Toolkit container. The OGSA-DAI SPOA service is only accessible by using the secure Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [12] protected TCP port 8443, so hardening focus on this level is limited to this specific application (that is the Globus Container).
Gridsphere [16] acts as a frontend for the Regional Head Service (RHS) and facilitates administrators to deploy resources as well as to make changes to running systems through an administrative fallback shell. Operations executed via this fallback shell are timely (and functionally) limited and every action is protocolled into a LOG file. Fig. 3 presents an overview of the involved components and resources. The Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) is a security-hardened system with OGSA-DAI as single point of access, where all interactions are recorded into a LOG file. Only two interactions are allowed:
(1) Queries to the database (2) System configurations by an administrator.
The only port reachable from outside the SVM is TCP 8443, where OGSA-DAI is waiting for connections. In the implementation of underlying solution this was realized with the help of an iptables firewall script, which is listed in section IV For simplification it is assumed that the firewall of the SVM is the perimeter firewall, which will be dynamically reconfigured, if a fallback shell is needed.
Minor OGSA-DAI modifications were made to provide administrative interactions, which allows for initiating a remote fallback shell if a specified activity is received (ref Fig. 5 ). A message containing a dynamic port is sent from the portal to the SVM, OGSA-DAI checks if the user is authorized and extracts the content of the message. This dynamic port is used to establish a reverse Secure Shell (rSSH) from the SVM to the portal. This means communication is initiated from the SVM and not from portal site. The Internet Protocol (IP) address of the portal and the SVM server are hard coded resulting in increased security. Even if an attacker could manage to send a message requesting a fallback shell the SVM would accept, he would never be able to connect to the SVM because of the hard-coded IP addresses. Details about the fallback shell will be provided within the next section.
Logging at OGSA-DAI level is implemented by logging classes, which can be extended and customized. Those classes were specially implemented upon our request by Ally Hume, who is part of the OGSA-DAI development team, and are since included into the regular OGSA-DAI releases. A custom event handler class needs to be written implementing the interface class BlockReaderListener (ref. Listing 4 in Section IV-B2). Within this class it can be defined if a certain input is of interest, which results in producing a LOG entry. For example, it can be specified, that only statements of type expression as input to an SQLQuery activity are relevant. Each time such an event occurs, the event handler class will be called and all custom logging activities, implemented in this class, will be written to the LOG file.
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A. Portal
The RHS portal provides portlets to manage the project grid infrastructure and semantic SPOA LOG analysis (cf Fig. 3 ). The portal security requirements we apply, are based upon [20] , where an evaluation of existing grid portals is conducted together with recommendations for implementation.
To remedy some of the drawbacks mentioned in [20] we apply a certificate based login to the RHS based on the Grid Account Management Architecture [21] and focus on extending the ability to generate audit trails.
B. Side-access-free Single Point of Access (SPOA) Secure Virtual Machine (SVM)
The side-access-free SPOA SVM we apply is an extension of the SVM presented in [18] , which consists of a boot system (BS) image and an encrypted partition (EP) image. BS contains the basic system required to accomplish the secure initialisation procedure resulting in a mount of EP where the application of the system is stored in encrypted form.
EP itself contains the SPOA system. As the system layer is secured by the SVM technology we harden the contents of the now created SPOA system with common techniques. An example guide for system hardening can be found in [22] . This provides a secured, service based access to the resources that covers all application-based access and most of the common access requirements.
C. Secure interactive fallback DBMS access
The SPOA interface generally prevents every direct access to the Data Base Management System (DBMS). Several situations may however require a direct commandline access to the DBMS. This may be due to a DBMS specific command not executable over the JDBC interface connecting OGSA-DAI and the DBMS or a generic bug hunting effort.
We denote such a direct commandline access to the DBMS a fallback shell. Access to this fallback shell has to be timely (and functionally) limited, restricted to a certain Distinguished Name (DN), accessible only from the RHS the resource is associated to, and completely audited. That is, every action has to be protocolled into a LOG file and will be subject to logging on the RHS. No additional ports need to be opened for such an access, which supports the high security needs of the SVM.
A fallback shell can be requested from within the RHS portal. Fallback shell authorization on deployed resource sites is confined to a specific user's DN. The principal investigator respectively the ultimately responsible person (may be impersonated through the project head service (PHS)) of the project can be requested to issue a timely limited access to this DN creating a proxy certificate at the project's MyProxy [23] service. The password to retrieve this proxy certificate is then handed over to the person requiring fallback shell access.
The mentioned functionality is part of different portal applications available for Gridsphere. For MyProxy certificate management and checkout we use the respective portlets provided by the Vine toolkit [24] .
1) Fallback Shell Example:
If an administrator wants to e.g. check the status of a service, he first has to request authorization. If he is allowed to conduct the desired action (checking will be done organizationally), a proxy certificate within the MyProxy service is created for him, valid only for a certain amount of time. Afterwards he can use the following process to interactively administer the database system (also depicted in Fig. 4 , where p = 2222):
1) The administrator uses the Gridsphere portal (that is the RHS) to request a fallback shell on a specific side-access free SPOA SVM. The request chooses a free ephemeral port p (on the RHS) between 1025 and 65535 and 166 Towards a Model for Side Access Free Grid Resources by Means of Virtualized Data Grids Figure 4 . For administrative tasks a message containing a dynamic port is sent to SVM's OGSA-DAI port, whereupon a reverse secure shell is initiated by the SVM system.
2) creates a message containing p, authorizing itself with the eligible proxy certificate. The resource authorizes the message and, if valid, extracts p, executing the shell script with p as parameter. 3) This script initiates a secure shell (SSH) connection to the RHS portal.
The IP address of the RHS portal is contained within the specific fallback shell script, which limits SSH connections to the RHS the resource is associated to. 4) The administrator uses the fallback shell utilizing port p. 5) Administrative shell is tunnelled to the SVM server.
At portal site SSH port 22, or any other pre-defined port, gets dynamically opened when the fallback shell request is sent. This port only accepts connections from the IP address of the SVM for a certain amount of time t (where t ≤ 1h, can be defined by access granting party). This enables the SVM to establish a SSH connection to the portal. The administrator can now use the established SSH connection to invoke the reverse shell with the command "ssh localhost -p p". This method seems complicated, but is used for the following reason: during the whole communication no additional ports at the SVM or portal server need to be publicly opened, which significantly increases security. Communication is only initiated by SVM and the IP addresses of the portal and the SVM are hard coded and cannot be changed maliciously. This way the fallback shell connection is limited to those two legitimate machines and cannot be used maliciously.
D. Audit trails
To ensure that each data access will be logged and can be reconstructed, strict logging is enforced. Although logging is the key concept for audit trails, we will concentrate on the infrastructure taking the responsibility that all activities carried out produce LOG entries and no access without logging is possible. We will only briefly describe how LOG files are produced, but will leave the format, secure transfer from SVM to portal and evaluation of LOG files to future work. LOG files must be held at both sites, the portal and the SVM. At portal site every command issued through the fallback shell will be logged before it is sent to and executed by the SVM. Details about how logging is realized at portal site are described in the following section.
At least user information, commands executed and a timestamp are recorded in XML format, i.e. it is human readable as well as processable by computers.
Additionally the SVM records all commands which are executed by administrators into a separate LOG file stored at its own site. This enables the matching of records from both sites afterwards. The current implementation uses bash history to record commands at SVM side, but several other solutions exist.
As unnecessary information is removed while parsing the LOGs into an XML-enabled format, file size typically decreases although additional information in the form of XML tags is added. This has been proven by a Globus Toolkit LOG file -globus-gatekeeper.log -whereas the file contains more than 507.550 lines of code and has a file size of about 22 MByte. This file was parsed into an XML-enabled one with about 12 MByte in size.
Queries from Virtual Organization (VO) members will be logged by special OGSA-DAI logging classes at database side. LOG files will automatically be rotated and securely transferred, but this is ongoing work and will be discussed in future work. Important facts for this work are that every interaction with SVM is recorded to guarantee complete audit trails.
IV TECHNICAL DETAILS A. GridSphere Portal
The interactive shell is set up by a SSH servlet implementation which runs within the GridSphere portal. We use a modified version of the SSH Web Proxy servlet [25] to implement logging functionality. The connection is automatically created within the portal without any additional information to be specified by the user.
To account for the required logging, the servlet is modified to record every action to the RHS LOG with a special mark (i.e. a special XML tag), such that every access occurring via this interface can easily be monitored.
The modifications, which provide logging functionality are clearly arranged (the modifications to turn it into a portlet are not covered here). There are two parts to be modified: The input of the respective user, and the output delivered from the remote shell.
The original version shell output (i.e. interactive shell) is presented by shell.jsp, which provides two fields: a screen for the current output of the server and a formular field for command input. The associated classes SshShellServlet.java for input, and shell.jsp itself, or its superclass, for output. So we need to extend these classes by the specific logging code.
To protect the GridSphere portal from unauthorized access, a firewall script is used to reject every connection attempt, except to the GridSphere portal port. If a fallback shell is initiated, the firewall rule set gets dynamically reconfigured
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Towards a Model for Side Access Free Grid Resources by Means of Virtualized Data Grids to allow SSH connection at port 22 from the SVM IP the request was sent to. The reconfiguration of the firewall happens just before the connection request is sent from the portal to the SVM. Both, the dynamic and the static part of the firewall rule set are listed in Listing 1. The last call of the dynamic part invokes a shell script that closes the firewall "hole" opened for the rSSH connection from the SVM after a certain amount of time. This way the reverse fallback shell is limited to exactly this pre-specified amount of time.
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B. Secure Virtual Machine (SVM)
Technically the hosting server for the Secure Virtual Machine consists of a Linux operating system, or any other Unix-like environment, capable of installing the Xen hypervisor. For the reference implementation, we used Debian 4.0 and Xen 3.2.
The virtual machine which is hosted on this environment is created as described in [18] . The system is hardened and an OGSA-DAI instance, embedded into a Globus Container, is bound to a MySQL database (which is not a necessity, any other DBMS supported by OGSA-DAI may be used). The Globus Container listens on TCP port 8443 for GSI secured connections; it provides the only interface between the DBMS and the network. All other traffic is blocked by the iptables firewall script as depicted in Listing 2.
If a fallback shell needs to be initiated, it can only be initialized from the portal by an authenticated and authorized user. How authentication and authorization are conducted has already been described previously. From technical point of view the message sent from the portal to the SVM is received by OGSA-DAI and the dynamic port is extracted. This port is used as a parameter to invoke the script depicted in Listing 3, called open_reverse_shell.sh:
170
Towards a Model for Side Access Free Grid Resources by Means of Virtualized Data Grids Listing 3: The script open_reverse_shell.sh is located at an SVM and will be called after a request for a fallback shell has been received at OGSA-DAI. As a result a reverse secure shell connection is initiated enabling secure and controlled administration of the system.
Invoking the script is straight forward. Assume port p was chosen as dynamic port from the portal, the SVM will call the script with the command open_ reverse_shell.sh p. <USER> and <IP of portal> are hard coded, to restrict shell communication to those legitimate systems, PORT will be assigned the value p.
We tested the whole procedure with the following environment: The portal's IP address is 192.168.0.1, the privileged user name for SSH connection is This results in a SSH connection being established from the SVM to the portal, which from now on can be used to tunnel the fallback shell used by the administrator on the portal. The SVM is authenticated against the portal with the help of certificates, which means, the portal has imported the public key of the user admin into /home/admin/. ssh/authorized_keys. As the user admin at SVM's site possesses the corresponding private key to the public key stored at the portal's site, he can authenticate himself and establish the SSH connection. Details about the setup of the SVM and the portal are depicted in the following section. 1) Required OGSA-DAI modifications: OGSA-DAI can easily be extended by custom classes, e.g. for authorization or activities interacting with resources.
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Opening the fallback interface is implemented by such a custom OGSA-DAI activity. Fig. 5 shows the involved components. The client submits a request containing this ConnectFallback activity with all required parameters (port, but user could be an option too). On SVM side, the activity calls a shell script which can be configured on a resource basis 2 , defined in its OGSA-DAI resource descriptor file. Hence, different fallback interfaces can be established for different DBMS implementations. Prior to executing the fallback script, the authorization of the caller is checked. The actual caller's DN is contained in the current service call to Globus, if any form of authorization on that level is configured. Since we require at least an SSL connection, this information is available. The DN of the subject allowed to open the fallback interface is configured in the activity's configuration. Therefore, only a single subject can access the direct DBMS interface. Listing 5: This code shows an example of an implementation of the method blockReadEvent where the distinguished name (DN) and the SQL query are written into the LOG file.
V. SETUP OF SPOA ENVIRONMENT
The nodes hosting the side-access-free SPOA resources (although executing a virtual machine) have to provide a network connection which allows full integration of the resource. Therefore an official IP address has to be provided with a registered hostname to enable the usage of a grid certificate. So, in practice, a physical site considering to provide resources for the secure grid infrastructure has to allocate a cloud resource (in our case a Nimbus resource) with a "free slot" for a virtual machine matching our criteria. We assume several such cloud resources to exist in the VO, provided by project partners.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The scope of this paper is limited to cover how logging of each interaction with the hosting SVM can be guaranteed and how security of the database system can be increased. For a sound system capable of detecting security relevant activities and to fulfil auditing requirements, LOGs must be concentrated and evaluated as well. Future work will elaborate on the detailed structure of LOGs, which comprises configuration of OGSA-DAI logging classes, type of LOG data, secure transport of LOGs and evaluation. As current research shows, problems arise when distributed LOGs have to be aggregated and evaluated to detect malicious activity. We plan to enrich logging data with XML tags and will map them to an XML Schema, such that it enables to answer security relevant questions. Evaluation of LOGs and the extraction of information that is relevant for different stakeholders will then be possible by means of extensible Stylesheet Language Transformation (XSLT).
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a new concept, which ensures side-access-free single point of access (SPOA) to data that hosted within virtual Grid resources. The virtual machine database is realized by a Nimbus workspace only accepting connections through an OGSA-DAI interface (SPOA), where logging of every data interaction is enforced. Administrative activities are timely limited and conducted via OGSA-DAI interface as well, which guarantees that even administrators cannot tamper with or access data without being recorded. Additionally a GridSphere portal is implemented as a user interface for easy interaction and as a consolidation point for LOG files. This infrastructure guarantees secure sharing of sensitive data within virtual organizations and provides full control over data access and modifications by all-embracing audit trails. This enables an easily deployable and usable solution for scientists to share data and coevally to comply with strict laws such as HIPAA. The main benefits are • Easy deployment and usage of virtualized databases within Grid environments • Guaranteed logging by ensuring side-access-freeness, providing fulfilment of regulative requirements • Audit trails capable of reconstructing data access and modifications • Controlled and easy administration • Increased data security • Keeping data control to data owner in a detective manner
